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Abstract 
In 1989, the credit union system in Costa Rica is once again faced with a serious 
• crisis of insolvency, after an impressive recovery from its crisis in 1980-1981. This paper 
• outlines the major structural problems that confront the credit union movement in Costa 
Rica and that explain its current crisis. It is felt that if these structural problems are 
resolved, the future performance of the system can be significantly improved. 
The first section presents a brief summary of the major events that led to the 
private financial markets crisis in 1987 and 1988 and discusses its impact on the credit 
union system. The second section focuses on the institutional weaknesses of the 
individual credit unions as financial intermediaries, and suggests important reforms to 
overcome them. Finally, the third section suggests the optimal design for the second 
level organizational structure for the credit unions, to address the major problems 
discussed here. 
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FINANCIAL REFORMS IN THE CREDIT UNION SYSTEM OF COSTA RICA 
by 
Rodrigo A Chaves and Jeffrey Poyo* 
I. Introduction 
In 1989, the credit union system of Costa Rica has once again faced a serious 
crisis of insolvency, after an impressive recovery from its earlier crisis in 1980-1981. Both 
the individual credit unions as well as their second-level institution, Fedecredito, achieved 
an impressive growth of total assets and membership during the six years between 1982 
and 1987, based upon voluntary deposit mobilization. Although the origins of the present 
crisis may be said to have begun outside the credit union system, since it has been in 
part a result of the failure of several non-regulated finance companies, which undermined 
depositor conficence in private financial intermediaries, it is no less evident that the 
administrative and financial fragility of the credit unions themselves contributed to this 
outcome, as well, by transforming what would have been a mild cold into a life-
threatening bronchitis. 
The credit unions are a very important component of the Costa Rican financial 
markets, not only because of the number of their members and the volume of their total 
assets, but also because they represent the only private financial institution with an 
important presence in the rural areas. Because they are mutualist institutions, in which 
the members are both the clients and the owners, the relatively small rural credit unions 
possess a comparative advantage in obtaining information for the evaluation of the 
creditworthiness of their clientele. Their costs are relatively low, when compared to 
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those of the nationalized or private banks, and because of their size, they impose lower 
transactions costs on their clients, as well. As a result of the recent growth and 
development of the credit union system, the rural population obtained greater access to • 
formal financial markets. These important gains are presently in danger, given a crisis 
that threatens the financial viability of the system. 
The objective of this paper is to outline the major structural problems that 
confront the credit unions sytem as a whole and that help explain why it has once again 
been overcome by a financial crisis, after a period of six years of rapid growth and 
development. It is felt that if these structural problems were resolved, the future stability 
of the system could be significantly improved. The structural problems analyzed in this 
paper may be grouped into three main categories: (1) microeconomic problems at the 
credit union level; (2) second-level political and financial organization issues; and (3) 
legal and regulatory framework requirements. 
The first section presents a brief summary of the major events that led to a severe 
crisis in the private financial markets during 1987 and 1988, and an evolution of its 
impact on the credit union system. The second section explores the institutional 
weaknesses of the individual credit unions as financial intermediaries, and suggests major 
reforms needed to overcome them. The third section contains an outline of a second-
level organizational structure which could address the major problems found therein. The 
last section discusses the political economy milieu of the credit union system, in order 
to identify opportunities of obstacles for the desired reform. 
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II. Crisis in the Private Financial Markets 
The crisis in the private financial markets of Costa Rica had its origins in the 
• insolvency of a series of non-regulated finance companies, which occurred throughout 
1987 and the first quarter of 1988. A partial listing of the major events is provided 
below: 
Financial scandal at the National Stock Exchange 
Autos Tibas e Inversiones El Sol failures 
Escalante y Asociados failure 
UNINSA failure 
COFIDESA (Orlando Sotela) failure 
Corporaci6n de lnversiones Tico Americana, S.A failure 
Financiera Serfec Consultores failure 
IBESA failure 
Crediticia arrangements 
October 
January 
June 
November 
November 
November 
December 
January 
February 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1987 
1988 
1988 
The crisis began with the failure of a series of minor finance companies, which 
spread to others, as investors began to withdraw their funds in fear. With the 
unexpected increase in inflation and the growing wedge between the official and the 
black market exchange rates, the Central Bank carried out policies aimed at restricting 
the growth of the money supply. As a result, short-term interest rates rose, and the risk 
premium paid by the private sector grew significantly, because of the resulting panic. In 
the last quarter of 1987, the risk premium paid by the private sector over the public 
sector quadrupled, from approximately 1.4 percentage points to 5.6 percentage points per 
annum, because of investor lack of confidence in the private financial and non-financial 
institutions.1 
1 See Jeffrey Poyo, "Crisis, Mercados Financieros Duales 
y la Estructura de Tasas de Interes en Costa Rica: 1985 - 1988," 
BOLSA, Bolsa Nacional de Valores, San Jose, Septiembre 1988. 
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This rise in interest rates created serious instability for many brokerage houses at 
the National Stock Exchange, since they had been taking significant interest rate risks 
through their investment strategy for money market funds. With the rise in short-term • 
interest rates, and the massive withdrawal of funds by panic-stricken investors, some 
brokerage houses had to be bailed out by the National Stock Exchange, in order to avoid 
a financial debacle there. When the financial crisis finally led to the bankruptcy of the 
first regulated finance company (Crediticia), and deposit instability was even felt among 
the private commercial banks, the Central Bank finally intervened, by injecting additional 
liquidity into the market. The credit unions were not isolated from these problems of 
financial panic and between June 1987 and March 1988, their deposits were drawn down 
by 781 million colones (almost US$10 million). 
ill. Structural WeaJcnesses of the Credit Union System 
Between 1982 and 1987, the credit union system of Costa Rica experienced a very 
rapid rate of growth, based on a strategy of voluntary deposit mobilization, both from 
members and non-members. With a very aggressive interest rate policy, they were able 
to mobilize a significant volume of domestic savings. Their institutional and admin-
istrative development lagged far behind the growth in total assets, however, and as a 
result these institutions were incapable of weathering the financial crisis that confronted 
them at the beginning of the third quarter of 1987. 
The very rapid growth in funds mobilized by the credit unions eventually began 
to outstrip the capacity of their traditional clientele to absorb loans. This took place 
because these institutions kept their deposit interest rates high, even when their local 
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investment opportunities were exhausted. They were thus pressured to find new 
· profitable investments fo the surplus funds they were generating and, as a result, they 
made serious errors in their asset-liability management decisions. These errors began 
with the race to construct their own buildings, financed with the deposits and shared 
mobilized from the public. This construction frenzy is made evident today by the 
unnecessarily large buildings which now house many of these institutions. The second 
major mistake was to diversify their services into non-financial activities, as they opened 
their own supermarkets, pharmacies, hardware stores, clothing stores, agricultural input 
stores and the like. Not only were the majority of these investments unprofitable, and 
• 
had to be subsidized by the savings and loan department but, as in the case of the 
buildings, they also contributed to the serious imbalance in the term structure of their 
assets and liabilities. 
In an effort to expand their loan portfolios, the credit unions began to make loans 
to non-members from outside their geographic region. Once the rural credit unions 
expanded beyond their geographic area of influence, they lost their informational 
comparative advantage, which in part had made up for their lack of banking expertise. 
In an effort to maximize the return on their liquid reserves, some of these institutions 
made highly speculative investments in non-regulated finance companies, as well, attracted 
by the very high deposit rates of interest offered there. These very high rates were a 
reflection, however, of the moral hazard problems that permeated some finance 
companies. 
Beginning in the first quarter of 1987, the credit unions were confronted with an 
unusually high withdrawal of deposits and of shares on the part of their member and 
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non-member depositors. This unexpected withdrawal of deposits added to their financial 
mistakes and made the quality and liquidity of their asset base insufficient to respond to 
the demand for withdrawals. In fairness it must be pointed out, nevertheless, that other 
private financial institutions with much stronger management capabilities and asset quality 
could not confront this massive withdrawal of deposits, as was the case of Crediticia. 
The policies implemented by this regulated financiera and by the credit union system 
stand in stark contrast today, however, as the former institution not only maintained high 
interest rates paid on deposits throughout the crisis, but it bas also been able to pay off 
virtually all depositors, in a period of one to two years after the onset of the crisis, 
without any support from the Central Bank or the Government. It suffered from a 
liquidity (term-structure) problem, not from poor assets. The credit unions, on the other 
hand, lowered their deposit interest rates and possess portfolios of low-quality assets. 
Those credit unions which had maintained a 10 percent voluntary reserve fund 
with the Federation began to withdraw these funds, in order to honor the withdrawal of 
their members' savings. This, however, created a serious problem for Fedecredito, which 
had in tum lent these funds out, at an average term structure which by far exceeded the 
sight-deposit nature of the reserves of the credit unions deposited with Fedecredito. The 
Federation was then forced to borrow at the National Stock Exchange, at interest rates 
far exceeding those obtained on the loans made with these funds, and thus seriously 
jeopardizing Fedecredito's profitability. 
The liability base of the credit unions began to erode, as the members withdrew 
their deposits and shares, in an effort to salvage their savings. Operational losses kept 
growing, as well as delinquency in their loan portfolio kept rising. The rapid growth in 
~ I 
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delinquency was the result, in part, of the poor quality of the loan portfolio, and, in part, 
· of the members' awareness that the only way to withdraw their savings with the 
• institution was to become delinquent on their loans, since the withdrawal of both shares 
and deposits had been frozen. When these institutions finally turned to the Federation 
for assistance, Fedecredito made policy recommendations that were more consistent with 
the liquidation of these institutions than with their recovery. 
Private financial markets were immersed at this time in one of the most serious 
crises of their history, that had led to a temporary rise in both the level and structure 
of interest rates. Private financial and non-financial institutions were forced to pay a risk 
premium four times their historical levels, in order to mobilize resources at the National 
Stock Exchange. In an effort to reduce the operational lossess of the individual credit 
unions, the Federation recommended, however, that they reduce their financial costs by 
cutting deposit interest rates in half and by capitalizing between 15 and 50 percent of 
their deposit liabilities into share accounts. It is important to mention that share deposits 
have traditionally earned negative or very low returns for the credit union members. 
Whatever pressures had existed on the part of the depositors to withdraw their savings, 
therefore, were significantly reinforced by these policies, which implied a partial 
confiscation of their savings and a rate of return only a fraction of prevailing market 
rates. 
In combination with these policies, the Federation designed a share capitalization 
plan, which called for the aggressive mobilization of share accounts. The belief was that 
the savings deposits represented a costly and unstable source of funds and that the credit 
unions' emphasis should be on the mobilization of share accounts which, because of the 
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low profitability of the credit unions, earn a rate of return close to zero. The proposed 
development strategy was for these institutions to withdraw from voluntary deposit 
mobilization. Credit union members were expected to sign IOU's (papres), agreeing to • 
deposit in their share account a fixed amount on a monthly basis. As expected, this 
recovery plan was a complete failure and it only eroded the conficence on the part of 
the depositors even further. These recommendations only confirmed the poor quality of 
the technical assistance that the Federation provided to its member credit unions during 
this difficult period. 
One of the important lessons out of this crisis has been a recognition of the 
concept that share accounts are not capital in the financial sense of the word, that is, 
equity that would serve to absorb operational losses, protecting the deposit and other 
liabilities. Because credit union members can withdraw their investment in shares by 
falling or remaining delinquent on their loans, this means that the true capital in these 
institutions consists only of grants and retained earnings. The implication of this is that 
their capital base is inadequate and that reforms must be implemented in order to 
significantly increase their capital adequacy. 
IV. The Federation of Credit Unions 
One of the most important structural weaknesses of the credit unions sytem has 
been the serious lag in the development of adequate management capabilities, consistent 
with their asset growth, as reflected by their inadequate response to the recent crisis. 
With the support of USAID, in 1982 the Federation attracted qualified personnel to 
manage the institution and as a result it was able to grow quite rapidly. Other agencies, 
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such as the German Reiffeissen Union, COL.AC, the IDB, and the Canadian SIDJ 
· ( desjardin) joined AID's effort in helping Fedecr6dito. Over time, however, the 
Federation began to be transformed into a revenue-maximizing institution, that did no 
reflect the objectives of its owners (the credit unions), but that actually developed 
objectives of its own, at time in contradiction with those of its member cooperatives. 
Because the department that was supposed to provide technical assistance and training 
to the credit unions was not a revenue-generating center, its importance declined and it 
was relegated to a marginal role within the structure of Fedecr6dito. As a result, the 
credit unions quickly outgrew their internal administrative capabilities and no institution 
was in a position to provide the necessary inputs to further develop these capabilities. 
With its impressive growth between 1982 and 1987, the Federation was becoming 
the favorite institution for foreign donor organizations through which to channel financial 
resources. This access to subsidized foreign loans made domestic savings mobilization 
increasingly less attractive, given its higher costs and because it taxed the financial 
management capabilities of the Federation. As claimed in July, 1989 by the General 
Manager of the Federation, the future strategy of the credit union system would be to 
mobilize "social capital," in the form of share accounts, from the members to the credit 
unions and from the credit unions to the Federation. This would allow both the credit 
unions and the Federation to reduce the cost of funds, while providing the needed capital 
base to be leveraged with external loans. 
The Federation began by capitalizing up to 40 percent of each loan that it granted 
to its member credit unions. This capitalization was an elegant way of forcing the credit 
unions to maintain a compensating deposit with zero rate of return for an amount equal 
10 
to 40 percent of the value of the loan they were requesting. H the federation charged 
28 percent on a loan to the credit union, the effect of the capitalization was to raise the 
effective rate of interest to 47 percent, because of the compensating balance. These • 
forced savings served as a tax on the member credit unions and could only be withdrawn 
if the credit union decided to withdraw from the Federation or to become delinquent on 
their loans. 
V. Debt Swap and Credit Union Rescue Plan 
In July of 1988, Fedecredito received a grant from the Government of Costa Rica 
to purchase the charter of the failed Banco de Alajuela. One of the main motivations 
for the creation of the Banco Federado on the basis of this chart was the fact that the 
expectations on the part of the credit unions of receiving loans from Bancoop had been 
frustrated over the years. The agreement signed between Fedecredito, the Government, 
and USAID, for a donation of 300 million colones for the creation of this bank, is highly 
restrictive and unrealiztic. It forces Banco Federado to allocate 300 million colones in 
credit to Fedecredito member cooperatives in just 12 months. When the agreement was 
reached, most of the major credit unions were facing a serious financial crisis and were 
not creditworthy. The agreement nevertheless provided Fedecredito with 22 million 
colones a year to allow it to operate a deposit insurance fund. No technical studies 
supporting the creation of the insurance fund are available yet. 
Because the banking law requires at least ten cooperatives to create a cooperative 
bank, such as the Banco Federado, Fedecredito distributed 1,000 colones shares to nine 
credit unions arbitrarily chosen by the federation's staff among all member cooperatives. 
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Fedecredito retained the remaining shares of the bank (399.9 million colones). Although 
· the Banco Federado is now in operation, apparently Fedecredito plans to retain some 
financial intermediation activities outside this institution. This financial intermediation 
must be completely separated from the political and representational roles of Fedecredito 
in order to avoid some of the institutional problems described in this paper. 
In recognition that the metropolitan area market is fairly well covered by the 
existing financial intermediaries (including some members of Fedecredito) and that to 
gain market share in the Capital would be fairly difficult, Banco Federado's strategy is 
presently focusing on the rural market. Serious questions exist, however, with regard to 
the degre of competition that this bank will represent for its own member credit unions. 
The objective so far is to establish bank officer at the same building of the credit unions, 
offering "complementary" services to those of basic financial intermediation already 
supplied by the credit unions. 
In August 1989, Banco Federado entered into a debt conversion transaction, in 
representation of Fedecredito, in an effort to mount a credit union rescue plan. The 
Banco Federado invested approximately 200 million colones and acquired 513 million 
colones worth of Central Bank Monetary Stabilization Bonds, at 15 years and with an 18 
percent annual rate of interest. The idea has been to have the individual credit unions 
purchase these bonds from the Banco Federado, at a 40 percent discount on the face 
value. Fedecredito would then accept these bonds at face value, in payment of debt and 
for the Federation to take over the deposit liabilities that the credit unions are not in 
condition to redeem. The Federation would then replace these credit union deposits with 
its own certificates. These certificates would carry the same interest rates and term of 
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the Stabilization Bonds. The plan is to obtain 790 million colones in Central Bank 
Stabilization Bonds in order to carry out this operation: 290 million for payment of the : 
credit union debt owed to Fedecr6dito and 500 million to back the deposit liabilities " 
taken over by Fedecredito. 
Although by substituting Fedecredito certificates backed by the Stabilization Bonds 
for credit union liability instruments, the credit union members will recover some portion 
of their original deposit, the loss that they will sustain will undermine the ability of the 
credit unions to mobilize deposits in the future. At the recommendation of the 
Federation, the credit unions have "capitalized" into share accounts between 15 and 50 
percent of their deposit liabilities. The Fedecr6dito certificates would have maturities 
of betwen 10 and 15 years, with a rate of interest of 17 percent. Given present market 
rates of interest, the depositors will be lucky if they eventually recover 25 percent of the 
value of their deposits. This reality casts doubts on whether these institutions will ever 
be able to mobilize voluntary savings again. It appears that the distribution of the 
capital gains from this financial transaction between the credit union depositors and the 
Federation is heavily weighted in favor of the latter. It is expected that the Federation 
will recover 290 million colones of debt which is now of very doubtful quality. 
Fedecr6dito is lobbying ot obtain an interest-rate subsidy from the government, as well, 
in order to make up for the difference betwen the rate of interest earned on these loans 
(24 percent) and the rate of interest earned on the Stabilization Bonds. 
The feasibility of this operation is still in doubt, however, because the credit 
unions are supposed to obtain external loans to finance the purchase of the bonds. If 
the credit unions were to use the limited cash flow that they are currently generating in 
: 
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order to buy the bonds, the financial viability of these institutions would even be in 
· greater doubt. Fedecredito has proposed that the loans to be granted to them could 
come from the following sources, in order to fund the 790 million colones in Stabilization 
Bonds: 
INFOCOOP 
Banco Federado 
Banco Popular 
Total: 
100 million 
100 million 
144 million 
344 million 
VI. Credit Union Corporation 
Several of the problems that the Credit Uunions are currently facing have 
had their origin in the structure and nature of their second-level organization and in the 
inadequacy of the legal framework that regulates such institutions. Most of these 
problems are inherent to the current organization of Fedecredito.2 There are significant 
advantages in a well-designed second-level cooperative institution, nevertheless, advantages 
related to the pooling of liquidity funds, the reduction · of information and transaction 
costs, and specialization of services are among the most important. 
The design of an optimal second-level organization for the Costa Rican credit 
union. movement must take into account the following constraints: 
(1) Structural problems inherent to credit union organizations. The 
proposed organization must prevent the repetition of the mistakes made in the past by 
2 See Rodrigo Chaves, "Necesidad de una Instituci6n de Segundo 
Grado para las Cooper a ti vas de Ahorro y Credi to Dominicanas, " 
Rural Financial Markets Program. The Ohio State University, 
September, 1986. 
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the individual credit unions and their federation. In particular, it is important to stress 
the political economy problems that arise as consequence of the link between financial : 
decisions, election of directors and executives, and the lack of external supervision and 
control. 
(2) The legal framework that regulates the actions of credit unions and 
other financial intermediaries. Private commercial banks, for example, are not allowed 
to issue certificates of deposit with maturity terms of less than 180 days and are required 
to hold reserves at the Central Bank ranging from 10 to 50 percent of those liabilities. 
Private banks are also subject to severe Central Bank restrictions on the growth of their 
credit programs. In contrast, the credit unions and their federation are exempt from 
these constraints. This provides such institutions with a comparative advantage in savings 
mobilization. 
(3) The ownership by Fedecredito of the Banco Federado makes it 
necessary to include this bank into the proposed organizational structure. This institution 
will make possible the separation of the representational and the financial activities 
currently undertaken by Fedecredito. The Banco Federado is also the natural instrument 
to introduce independent prudential supervision from outside to the second-level credit 
union structure. 
( 4) Other circumatances of the present credit union environment, such as 
the current power struggle between the Banco Federado and Fedecredito and the 
situation of some of its members. 
Considering the restrictions described above, the optimal operational structure for 
the Costa Rican credit union system would be the following: 
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General Assembly 
.-
.. 
• Auditor1a General 
de Entidades 
Financieras - - -_ - - , 
Board of Directors 
Banco Federado 
Corporation 
Development 
L - Foundation 
L!::======================tC R E D I T U N I 0 N S 
Stabilization 
Fund 
It is felt that this structure would maximize economies of scale, efficiency, and 
external supervision of the system, given present constraints, while at the same it would 
fully exploit the comparative advantages of credit unions, given the legal framework that 
regulates financial intermediaries. This design presents some parallels with the 
functioning of the credit union movement in the United States. The only legal limitation 
to the adoption of this structure is that Banco Federado must be a separate entity, 
although any combination of boards of directors and executives is valid, according to 
Costa Rican law. It seems a waste of resources (i.e., not to take advantage of economies 
of scale) to administer each institution separately as it is being currently done. 
Therefore, it seems advisable that these three institutions share not only their executive 
staff, but other services such as computer facilities, internal auditing, and all supporting 
administration services. 
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{A) DEYELOPMENT FOUNDATION 
The Development Foundation would attack three major problems at the individual 
credit union level. The first and most obvious is the lack of adequate financial and 
administrative skills of the credit union managers and directors. The Foundation would 
centralize and implement all the capacitation programs directed at improving the skills 
necessary to run a credit union. The most relevant training areas are: 
-Economic environment and financial strategies. 
-Financial trends and competition. 
-Accounting and internal control. 
-Asset and liability management strategies. 
-Composition and cost of funds. 
-liquidity planning. 
-Investment strategies. 
-Loan evaluation. 
The Foundation would become the source of information and technical advice for 
the member credit unions. It would collect relevant economic information and 
disseminate it, along with consistent policy advice. This service would greatly increase 
the affiliates' speed and adequacy of adjustment to their ever changing economic 
environment. In the United States there exist several institutions that provide similar 
services for the different sectors of the financial system (e.g., National Credit Union 
Association, American Banking Association, National Association Community Banks). 
The Foundation would serve as the system's baromometer as well. Its technicians would 
regularly visit the individual credit unions, in order to evaluate their particular situation 
and to provide specific recommendations. Such interaction and frequent contact between 
the Foundation and the credit unions present several advantages. The system would 
have an "early warning mechanism" for the eventual financial problems of its members, 
• . 
• 
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and the information gathered could be used by the Banco Federado, the stabilization 
fund, and the Superintendency of Credit Unions. 
· = Another important advantage of this institution is that it already has some 
significant sources of income. The donation agreement that created Banco Federado 
stipulates that, after the fifth year beyond the establishment of the bank, Fedecredito 
should spend 19.2 million colones a year for technical assistance and training services 
directed to its affiliates. This amount is 40 percent of the preferred dividends that 
Banco Federado must pay Fedecredito on its shares. In 1989 Fedecredito received a 
grant from REIFEEISEN UNION of about 50 million colones for the purchase of fixed 
assets and for pay-roll, to be used by its development department during a period of 
three years. Finally, the agreement that created Banco Federado provides 22 million 
colones a year for a deposit insurance system for the credit unions. 3 There exists strong 
evidence that such insurance is neither viable, given the financial position of the major 
credit unions, nor advisable, because of acute moral hazard problems. Instead, those 
resources could be used to provide the training and supervision needed by the system, 
including the funding of the activities of the Superintendency of Credit Unions. Such 
sources of income should be sufficient to cover the expenses necessary to establish and 
run the Foundation. 
(B) BANCO FEDERAPO 
Under the proposed design, Banco Federado would assume and centralize all the 
regular financial intermediation activities of the second-level organization. The bank 
3 See Rodrigo Chaves, "Fedecredito: Oportunidades y 
Peligros", Rural Finance Program, Ohio State University, Economics 
and Sociology Occasional Paper No. 1509, October 1988, pp. 50-52. 
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would be the institution lending for long-term and development purposes to the individual 
credit unions. The relationship between Banco Federado and the credit unions is not · 
intended to solve the affiliates' short-term liquidity problems, however. Banco Federado 
should provide credit only to creditworthy credit unions with specific development projects 
and a good financial position. This would become another source of discipline for the 
system's members. Banco Federado must be a second-story bank and it should not 
compete with the individual credit unions for the public's patronizing. 
In addition to the obvious benefits from specialization, the centralization of the 
financial intermediation activities at the Banco Federado would impose restrictions on 
the Corporation, by introducing external supervision and control into the system. Banco 
Federado is subject to the regulations and financial standards imposed by the General 
Superintendency of Financial Intermediaries ("Auditoria General de Entidades 
Financieras"). The Superintendency examines the quality of the loan portfolio, liquidity 
ratios, the degree of credit concentration, funding gap, and leverage among others. Such 
strict control would considerably reduce the political economy problems, discussed earlier, 
that arise from having the same board of directors make political and financial decisions 
simultaneously. The ability to use credit as a political instrument would be undermined. 
C) THE LIQUIDITY FUND 
The liquidity of a credit union depends on the ability of its management to ensure 
a regular inflow of funds to meet maturing obligations. Due to seasonal and market 
fluctuations as well as to a variety of reasons beyond the institution's control, some credit 
unions may need short-term credit in order to meet this demand for funds. 
• .
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The key role of the stabilization fund is to support the system's liquidity, by 
• moving funds from credit unions where there is a surplus of funds over current demand, 
. 
• 
• to credit unions that have short-term cash deficits. The strength and viability of the 
system is enhanced by effective liquidity support. Indeed, liquidity support services are 
indispensable if the credit unions are to function as a system, because the insolvency of 
one of them imposes a negative externality on the rest. This is so because the 
traditional credit union customers are not well informed about the financial situation of 
individual cooperatives and have the tendency to generalize from an individual situation 
to the remaining institutions. It is most likely, for example, that a transitory cash flow 
problem in a given credit union would cause a larger-than-average withdrawal of deposits 
from the others. 
The stabilization fund should operate as a mutual fund. It would pool the 
liquidity reserves of the individual credit unions and would invest these funds in very 
liquid and secure financial instruments. The advantages of pooling funds are several. 
Through pooling, a better rate of return should be realized, while at the same time 
pooling would reduce information and transaction costs for the system as a whole. 
Access to information and financial investment opportunities is improved with a large 
organization, because of its status as a large investor, as well as the staff's specialization 
on financial analysis. The aggregate amount needed for reserves should be propor-
tionatelly less for the system than it would be required for each individual credit union. 
The liquidity fund must be a separate legal entity from the Banco Federado, in 
order to avoid the Central Bank's reserve requirements as well as restrictions on the 
term structure of its liabilities. The credit unions would deposit at least ten percent of 
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their certificates of deposit and demand deposits into the fund. Those resources must 
be invested in very liquid and secure financial instruments, through the National Stock • 
• 
Exchange the credit unions would have immediate access to their liquidity deposits, .. 
whenever their cash flows justify such withdrawal. If a particular credit union had a 
greater need for cash, it would be eligible for a short-term loan of up to three times 
its liquidity deposits. It would be the responsibility of the Development Foundation to 
evaluate the credit union's financial position and the nature of its cash flow problem. 
The Development Foundation would also provide sound financial advice in order to solve 
this liquidity problem. 
The stabilization fund could function on a budget basis. That is, at the beginning 
of the year, the Corporation would estimate the expenses necessary to run this activity 
and would then subtract that amount from the interest income generated by the fund. 
The fund's remaining revenue would be distributed among the credit unions every three 
or six months. About two to three employees would be required to run the fund. It is 
expected that once thoses expenses have been subtracted, the yield that the credit unions 
would get on their liquidity reserves would be greater than the yields they would get if 
they had invested the funds individually. 
VII. REGU!ATORY FRAMEWORK 
There exists agreement on the part of all sectors involved that one of the most 
important causes of the system's current crisis is the lack of external supervision and 
prudential control. The system has never had an effective regulatory mechanism to 
supervise the financial activities of these institutions. 
• 
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Since credit unions are regulated by the Cooperative Law, the Auditorfa General 
• de Entidades Financieras is not responsible for their supervision. INFOCOOP is the 
. 
~ 
• state agency that is charged with the regulation of all cooperative organizations. It has 
never had neither the internal capacity to supervise the financial activities of the credit 
unions nor the political willingness to regulate the system, however this unwillingness 
arises from the fact that 4 out of 7 of INFOCOOP's directors are representatives of the 
cooperative movement. These 4 "cooperative" directors do not have incentives to regulate 
and supervise the movement they represent. 
It is obvious that the optimal solution to this problem would be to change the 
current legal framework, in order to provide the Auditorfa General de Entidades 
Financieras with the authority to supervise and take legal action against any credit union 
that is jeopardizing the value of its members's savings. According to a senior partner of 
the legal firm ASELEX, there exists political willingness, specially in the Executive 
branch, to implement such reforms. This would be achieved by introducing several 
amendments or even a bill for a new cooperative law during the Legislative Assembly's 
extraordinary meetings (February-May). 
It is also the opinion of this lawyer, that a short-term solution to this problem 
may come from a particular interpretation of Law No. 7107 (Ley de Mo<lernizaci6n 
Financiera,), especially its articles No. 124 and No. 131. Article No.131, item #4, states 
that it is in the authority of the Auditor General to decide which entities, different from 
banks and financieras, are subject to the Auditorfa's supervision. On the other hand, 
Article No. 124 excludes from the Auditorfa's jurisdiction all those intermediaries that 
are currently being regulated by special laws. According to this lawyer, it would be 
enough to demonstrate that credit unions are not actually being regulated by 
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INFOCOOP, in order to place these institutions under the Auditoria's scope of action. 
The reason why the Auditor General would be able to make this unilateral decision is . 
• 
that INCOOP regulates credit unions as "cooperatives" but not as "financial inter- • 
mediaries." Regardless of the course of action chosen in order to give the Auditoria 
General jurisdiction over the credit unions, which might even be INFOCOOP's delegation 
of these functions, there still exists a financial constraint. The Auditoria would have to 
supervise a large number of new institutions. This not only raises questions about the 
Auditoria's ability to handle the additional work, but it would actually be necessary to 
hire new employees. These expenses may be covered with the 22 million colones a year 
that Fedecredito receives from Banco Federado as preferred dividends. This mechanism 
would make credit union supervision more attractive to the Auditoria General. 
Given the importance that effective prudential supervision has on the financial 
stability of the credit union system, the process of introducing an amendment to the 
Cooperative Law has already been initiated, with technical assistance from the Ohio State 
University. The bill would provide the Auditorfa General de Entidades Financieras with 
the legal ability to supervise the financial activities of the credit unions. As requested 
by Dr. Carlos Saenz (Presidential Advisor, Chairman of Fosecoop, and member of the 
Central Bank's Board of Directors), a legal expert will draft a credit union chapter to 
be incorporated into the current Cooperative Law. 
It is important to indicate that Fedecredito, the individual credit unions, 
INFOCOOP, the Presidential Advisor, and the Central Bank all agree on the importance 
of such legal reform. The Central Bank and the Auditoria claim, however, that the 
latter would need some financial support to undertake the new responsibility. 
• 
"' 
"' 
.. 
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This legal reform would result from the following time table and lobbying process: 
A) The credit union chapter of the Cooperative Law would be completed at 
the beginning of December, 1989. It would be reviewed by esperts from 
the Ohio State University during the rest of that month. 
B) The new bill would be distributed to the interested groups by the end of 
December. Lobbying activities in favor of this legal change would take 
place through February. 
C) The bill would be approved by the Legislative Assembly in its extraordinary 
sessions (February - May, 1990). 
The lobbying should take place at 2 levels. First, at the Executive Branch, 
because the Central Government sets the agenda for the Legislative Assembly during its 
extraordinary sessions. It is important to convince INFOCOOP, the Central Bank, and 
the Casa Presidencial to make sure that the desired legal reforms will be part of the 
agenda of the Legislative for that period. Second, it would be necessary to convince 
some key PUSC and PLN legislators, in particular: 
PUSC PLN 
Luis Manuel Chac6n 
Oscar Avila 
Rodrigo Araya 
Juan Luis Delgado 
Alberto Fait 
Rosemary I<arspinski 
Mario Carvajal 
Jose Miguel Corrales 
It is felt that if these legislators agree with the reform, it will be easily approved. 
It is important to make sure that the right amount of supervision and control is exerted 
on the credit unions. Too much regulation could be as damaging as no regulation at all. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
